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It currently seems fashionable to refer to the
European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) questions
relating to art 5(1)(b) of Council Regulation
(EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000
on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters (‘the Regulation’).
Wood Floor Solutions v 
Silva Trade SA 
The latest judgment of the Court is that
in Wood Floor Solutions v Silva Trade SA
(Case C-19/09), handed down on 11
March 2010. The dispute between the
parties arose out of the termination of a
commercial agency contract that was
performed in several member states.
Wood Floor relied on art 5(1)(b) of the
Regulation to found jurisdiction in
Austria, where the company had
established its seat.Silva Trade challenged
the court’s jurisdiction, arguing that
more than three quarters of Wood
Floor’s turnover was generated in
countries other than Austria,and that art
5(1) did not provide for such a case.Silva
Trade argued that if the place of
performance could not be established
because the obligation in question was
not subject to geographical limitations,
art 5(1) was inapplicable and jurisdiction
should instead be founded on art 2.
At first instance, the Landesgericht
Sankt Pölten rejected the jurisdictional
challenge holding that commercial
agency contracts were covered by the
definition of ‘provision of services’ in
art 5(1)(b), and that where services
were provided in a number of
countries, jurisdiction should be
founded at the service provider’s centre
of business.That decision was appealed
before the Oberlandesgericht Wien,
who referred the matter to the ECJ.
The ECJ confirmed that the second
indent of art 5(1)(b) was applicable to
cases where services are provided in
several member states. Referring to its
judgment in Color Drack (Case C-
386/05),the Court noted that regarding
the sale of goods,where there are several
places of delivery of the goods,the ‘place
of performance’ must be understood as
the place with the closest linking factor
between the contract and the court
having jurisdiction. Therefore, as a
general rule,it will be the principal place
of delivery, which shall be determined
on the basis of economic criteria.
Unsurprisingly, the Court took the
same approach in relation to the
provision of services,vaguely identifying
‘the place of the main provision of
services.’ The Court outlined that for
commercial agency contracts, it is the
commercial agent who characterises the
contract and provides the services.Thus,
the place of performance must mean the
place of the main provision of services by
the agent, which must be deduced from
the contract itself.
Where the contract does not identify
the place of the main provision of
services, either because there are several
places or because no specific place is
expressly provided for, but the service
has been carried out,the Court provided
an alternative formula. In such a case,
account should be taken of the place
where the agent has for the most part
carried out his activities in performance
of the contract, provided that the
provision of services in that place is not
contrary to the parties’ intentions as it
appears from the contract.Factors to take
into account include the time spent at
the location and the importance of the
activities carried out there.
In the alternative scenario, where the
place of the main provision of services
cannot be determined from the contract
or from actual performance,the ‘place of
performance’ shall be the agent’s
domicile. It is therefore irrelevant where
the commercial agency has its registered
office, even though it may be
coincidental to the actual place of
performance or an agent’s domicile.
Car Trim GmbH v KeySafety
Systems Srl
Beforehand, on 25 February 2010, the
ECJ handed down its judgment in Car
Trim GmbH v KeySafety Systems Srl (Case
C-381/08). Here, the preliminary
reference to the Court considered the
difference between contracts for the ‘sale
of goods’and contracts for the ‘provision
of services’ under art 5(1)(b) of the
Regulation, and how to determine the
place of performance for contracts
involving carriage of goods.
Car Trim supplied KeySafety with
components used in the manufacture of
airbag systems.A dispute arose regarding
the termination of the supply contracts
and an action for damages was brought
before the German Regional Court of
Chemnitz, being the place where the
components were manufactured. The
Regional Court held that it had no
jurisdiction to rule upon the action,and
the Higher Regional Court also
dismissed the appeal. Car Trim
subsequently brought an appeal before
the German Federal Court of Justice,
who referred the matter to the ECJ.
The first question essentially asked
whether contracts for the supply of
goods to be produced or manufactured were
contracts for the sale of goods or
contracts for the provision of services,in
particular where the customer has
specified certain requirements with
regard to the provision, fabrication and
delivery of the components to be
produced.
The ECJ confirmed that the
Regulation does not define nor
provide any distinguishing features of
the two types of contract. Instead, art
5(1) identifies as a connecting factor
the obligation which characterises the
contract in question. It was noted that
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produced as contracts of sale, save for
certain exceptions, where, for example,
the customer undertakes to supply a
substantial part of the materials
necessary for their manufacture. The
Court thus concluded that the fact that
the goods need to be produced or
manufactured does not alter the
classification of the contract as one for
the sale of goods.Conversely,where all
or most of the materials from which
the goods are manufactured are
supplied by the purchaser, the Court
tentatively surmised that the contract
should be classified as one for the
provision of services.
It was further held that the supplier’s
obligation under the contract could be
a defining characteristic. Where the
seller is responsible for the quality of the
goods and their compliance with the
contract, that responsibility will ‘tip the
balance’ in favour of classification as a
contract for the sale of goods. Equally,
where the seller is responsible only for
correct implementation in accordance
with the purchaser’s instructions, the
contract should be classified as a
provision of services.
The second question concerned the
concept of ‘delivered’ in contracts
involving carriage of goods. Firstly, the
Court made it explicitly clear that
parties enjoy a freedom to contract in
defining the place of delivery of the
goods. In shipment sales, for example,
contracting on cif or fob terms will
usually result in the place of delivery
being the port of loading, when the
goods are taken ‘across the ship’s rail’.
The court must therefore determine
whether the place of delivery is
‘apparent’ from the provisions of the
contract, without reference to its
substantive law. If it is, then that place is
to be regarded as the place of delivery for
the purposes of art 5(1)(b). Where the
contract is silent however, regardless of
the substantive law of the contract, the
place of delivery shall be the place where
the goods were physically transferred or
should have been physically transferred
to the purchaser at their final destination.
Accordingly, it is the place where the
purchaser obtained, or should have
obtained, actual power of disposal over
the goods.
Previous judgments and 
pending references
Other recent judgments include Peter
Rehder v Air Baltic Corporation (Case C-
204/08), and Falco Privatstiftung &
Thomas Rabitsch v Gisela Weller-Lindhorst
(Case C-533/07). In Rehder, the Court
held that, in the case of air transport of
passengers from one member state to
another, the court having jurisdiction
under art 5(1)(b) to deal with a claim
for compensation based on the
transport contract,is the court which,at
the appellant’s choice, has jurisdiction
over the place of departure or the place
of arrival of the aircraft,as agreed in the
contract. In  Falco Privatstiftung, the
Court held that a contract under which
the owner of an intellectual property
right grants its contractual partner the
right to use that right in return for
remuneration is not a contract for the
‘provision of services’under art 5(1)(b).
Such a contract however, would fall
under art 5(1)(a), which, in accordance
with art 5(1)(c), is applicable to
contracts which are neither contracts
for the sale of goods nor contracts for
the provision of services.Consequently,
use of the principles that developed
from the Court’s case law in relation to
art 5(1) of the Brussels Convention,
must still continue to be made as
regards interpretation of art 5(1)(a) of
the Regulation.
References still pending before the
ECJ regarding art 5(1)(b) include that of
Electrosteel Europe SA v Edil Centro SpA
(Case C-87/10) and Ronald Seunig v
Maria Hölzel (Case C-147/09). The
former considers whether the place of
delivery is the place of final destination
of the goods covered by the contract, or
the place in which the seller is
discharged of his obligation to deliver –
this matter has seemingly been dealt
with in Car Trim.The latter deals with
the same questions as those outlined in
Wood Floor. Both judgments should
therefore be handed down presently,
and it will be interesting to see if 
any differences in the judgments 
are apparent.
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Under what circumstances may an injured
third party claim directly from the insurer of its
tort feasor? The Third Parties (Rights Against
Insurers) Act 2010 will enter into force upon
decision by the Secretary of State,and when it
does, P&I insurers will for the first time be
subject to the information duties provided for
by the Third Parties Act.
The Third Parties (Rights Against
Insurers) Act 2010 which will replace the
homonymous Act from 1930 received
Royal Assent on 25 March 2010.Having
passed through the House of Lords and
the House of Commons in just over
three months, it was nevertheless 10
years in the making, the Law
Commissions having issued the
underlying report as long ago as 2001
(LC272). The 2010 Act will, like its
predecessor the 1930 Act, apply in cases
of insolvency and in cases of company
winding up and will allow injured third
parties to claim directly against the
insurer. Given the particular structure of
the shipping business, with one-ship
companies whose only asset may have
been lost in connection with the very
event that gave rise to the liability, that
right is particularly pertinent. An
injured person or widow cannot very
well pursue a whole family of companies
and its directors via Rule B attachments